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Abstract
Starting in the early 1980s, the U.S. patent regime experienced ma-
jor changes that allowed the patenting of numerous scientic ndings
lacking in current commercial applications. We assess the rationality
of these changes in the legal and institutional environment for sci-
ence and technology policy. In order to model these changes in the
incentives for the commercialization of new ideas, we extend the stan-
dard multisector Schumpeterian growth theory by decomposing the
product innovation into a two-stage uncertain research activity. This
analytical structure, beside suggesting new sources of market and non-
market failures, allows us to compare the general equilibrium innov-
ative performance of an economy where early-stage scientic results
are patentable with the general equilibrium innovative performance of
an economic system where these earlystage results are unpatentable
and freely disseminated by public research institutions such as the
universities. If researchers are unguided by the invisible hand they
risk to invent redundant half-ideas, but public universities are bet-
ter at internalizing research externalities. When scientists can patent
their research, monopolistic research rms restrict entry in the applied
R&D. This makes a regime choice a priori controversial and dependent
on the exogenous data on technologies. We calibrate the model to the
US data and show that in the 70s, a relatively higher applied R&D
complexity magnied the public basic R&D ine¢ ciencies and justied
the patentability of basic scientic ndings.
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1. Introduction
Innovation economics recognizes sequentiality as a distinctive characteristic of the in-
novative process. Among them Susanne Scotchmer (1991) argued that "Most innovators
stand on the shoulders of giants, and never more so than in the current evolution of high
technologies, where almost all technical progress builds on a foundation provided by earlier
innovators. For example, most molecular biologists use the basic technique for inserting
genes into bacteria that was pioneered by Herbert Boyer and Stanley Cohen at the early
1970s, (...). In pharmaceuticals, many drugs like insulin, antibiotics, and anti-clotting
drugs have been progressively improved as later innovators bettered previous technolo-
gies." Scotchmer’s words do not miss to highlight that sequentiality plays a central role
in advanced biotechnologies. According to Roger Brent, the head of Molecular Sciences
Institute of Berkeley, in this field, the recent expiring of the U.S. patent on polymerase
chain reaction (a genetic procedure patented by F. Hoﬀman-La Roche and used in almost
all research fields of life sciences) will have terrific consequences on research by raising
the expectation3 of discovering new drugs for tropical diseases4.
According to Hecht (1999), at the end of 1926 Clarence W. Hansell, researcher at the
RCA Rocky Point Laboratory in Long Island, had already outlined the principles of opti-
cal fibres bundle functioning; in 1927 RCA was awarded the U.S. patent. However, until
1970, optical fiber had very little practical applicability for commercial use. The second
fundamental step to innovation came only with the development of laser technology and
the increasing demand for high frequency telecommunication tools in the late 1960’s,
3Heller and Eisemberg (1998) have pointed out that the patenting of gene sequences produce a tragedy
of the anticommons, i.e. a crumbling of rights which greatly amplify transaction cost, thus hampering
downstream research for biomedical advance.
4See "Patent Ending",The Economist, April 9th 2005. For further examples of patented research
inputs in the process of developing new marketable applications and therapies in biotechnology see
National Research Council (2004, pp.74, 75).
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when a group of researchers at Corning Glass Works (today Corning Inc.), following a
proposal of Charles Kao and Charles Hockam of the Standard Telecommunication Labo-
ratory in England, began to work on purifying glass. In 1970 they refined an optical fiber
bundle using pure SiO2 (it was the purest glass ever made) and were awarded the patent
for the Optical Waveguide Fibers capable of transmitting 65,000 times more information
than metallic wire.
Several studies in the law and economics of intellectual property documented how,
over the last 25 years, U.S. Court decisions switched from the traditional jurisprudential
limitation of the patentability of early-stage scientific findings lacking in current com-
mercial value to the conception that also fundamental basic scientific discoveries with no
current tradeable application (such as scientific theories, algorithms and genetic engineer-
ing procedures) fall in the general applicability of the patent system design. For example,
in 1980, in the Diamonds v. Chakrabarty case, the Supreme Court of United States ruled
that microorganism produced by genetic engineering could be patented. The Supreme
Court’s decision arrived two years before the introduction of the first commercial product,
human insulin, obtained with recombinant DNA techniques. Jensen and Thursby (2001)
study the licensing practices of 62 US universities. They find that "Over 75 percent of the
inventions licensed were no more than a proof of concept (48 percent with no prototype
available) or lab scale prototype (29 percent) at the time of license!". Moreover, most
of the inventions licensed were in such an embryonic state of development, that no one
could estimate their commercial potential and the inventor’s cooperation was required to
get a successful commercial development.
Universities and public laboratories have always been the main performers of basic
R&D in the United States and in Europe. Though an important reason for the relatively
low private contribution to basic R&D is often found in the high degree of uncertainty
that this activity involves in terms of future commercial application and success, the legal
permission to appropriate the fruits of years of investigations is making a big diﬀerence
between post-1980 US and current European innovation systems. If basic findings are
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not patentable, as was in the pre-Eighties US and in the current EU regime, the publicly
funded researchers or the university professors will likely investigate undirected by the
profitability concerns. Therefore they may end up with discovering economically useless
ideas, as a response to the random nature of their personal intellectual interests. Allowing
them to patent scientific findings would introduce an interface between intellectual spec-
ulation and consumer needs, thereby channelling scientific investigation in the direction
more demanded by the economy. Hence the post-Eighties US patenting regime allows its
national system of innovation to count on a maximum flow of basic research findings per
researcher. Instead, in the pre-Eighties US or in a European patenting regime, a smaller
fraction of the scientists’ discoveries would be useful for further commercial applications.
On the other side, the patentability of early-stage ideas, by granting monopolistic rents
on basic discoveries charges a heavier burden on the applied R&D industry, which re-
stricts the licensing decision of the research tool patent holders. This shifts the debate
on the merits of public basic research over private basic research from appropriability
concerns to other issues, as, for instance, the organization and the objectives of research
activity and the monetary and non monetary incentives guiding research activity in the
two systems (Lach and Shankerman, 2003; Aghion, Dewatripont and Stein, 2005).
Despite this controversial aspect of the innovation and growth policy, in the standard
Schumpeterian growth theory (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992
and 1998; Segerstrom, 1998; Howitt 1999) each R&D firm is assumed to undertake an
independent innovation process in order to produce a probability of discovering an idea
whose value immediately transfers into a tradeable application in the form of higher
quality products. In this literature, the innovation process is governed by a Poisson
process, by which an idea is instantaneously conceived and implemented into a new
product to be sold to the marketplace. Of course, the Schumpeterian growth theory
acknowledges the intertemporal spillover and the sequentiality for marketable products.
However, it cannot handle the many real world cases in which ideas have to undergo a
gradual development process before becoming embodied in a saleable technology, and
4
R&D firms gain an experience in multiple-stage research activities before developing
tradeable applications of basic scientific findings. Thus, the conception that only the
concrete embodiment of an idea is provided of economic value prove too restrictive in an
age in which a large part of the international academic community, jointly with a large
part of the R&D business community, expresses the need for an appropriate intellectual
property design to take into account both the sequential and cumulative nature of ideas
and the change in the technological paradigm determined by the biotechnology industry5.
This paper, by taking the R&D sequentiality into the Schumpeterian paradigm in-
vestigates the relation between the cumulative uncertainty involved in the two-stages
innovation process and the ineﬃciency in the public university system. We will consider
the lack of research direction of large scale publicly funded R&D, but also the ability of
public laboratories to coordinate their activities better than the freely entrant private
laboratories of the scenario with patentable research tools. Similarly, the positive incen-
tives to basic research set by the possibility to patent research tools will be contrasted
by the monopolistic underinvestment in the applied R&D. Our model therefore tries to
give an impartial, albeit stylized, representation of the debated issue of the desirability of
the patentability of research tools. Whether the positive or negative eﬀects of the post-
Eitghies US patent system prevail depends on the data. We have performed a numerical
attempt to evaluate the desirability of the US regime change in the early Eighties, by
plugging the available data on technology, employment and skill premium into our model.
After estimating the crucial R&D productivity parameters for the Seventies, we run the
model for the two opposite institutional scenarios. We find that during the Seventies
the old system was losing grounds on the perspective new patenting system, and the US
authorities took institutional decisions which allowed a more eﬃcient innovative activity
In our view, a crucial role was played by the steadily decreasing productivity of applied
R&D, which we estimated in a novel way. Other studies documented an increasing com-
5According to Gambardella (1995) and Henderson, Orsenigo e Pisano (1999), the pharmaceutical
research industry is now more influenced by prior scientific discoveries than in the past.
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plexity in the applied R&D activity (Kortum 1993 and 1997; Segerstom, 1998) as well.
If applied R&D becomes increasingly more complicated, it is important to have a large
flow of half-ideas from basic research. This implies that the ineﬃciency of public R&D
has to be removed more urgently. We claim that this justified the reform undertaken in
the US around 1980 and might recommend similar modifications in the European patent
law.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 set up a Schum-
peterian model with sequential innovation in two diﬀerent patent policy scenarios. In
the first scenario basic R&D achievements are patented and, afterwards, developed into
tradable applications within a completely privatized economy. In the second scenario
basic research findings are conceived and put into the public domain, and subsequently
embodied into marketable products by a large number of perfectly competitive private
R&D firms. In Section 4 we try to assess, on the basis of the analytical structure pro-
vided by the model, the relative advantages and disadvantages of granting no intellectual
protection to half-ideas. In Section 5 we calibrate the model with the U.S. data. Finally,
the main results are summarized in Section 6.
2. The Model
2.1 Overview
Consider an economy made up of a diﬀerentiated final good sector and a diﬀerenti-
ated research and development (R&D) sector, along the lines of Grossman and Helpman
(1991), where product improvements occur in the consumption good industries. Within
each industry, firms are distinguished by the quality of the final good they produce.
When the state-of-the-art quality product in an industry ω ∈ [0, 1] is jt(ω), research
firms compete in order to learn how to produce the jt(ω) + 1st quality product. This
learning process involves a two-stage innovation path, so first a firm catches a glimpse of
innovation through the jt(ω) + 12th inventive half-idea and then other firms engage in a
patent race to implement it in the jt(ω) + 1st quality product.
In what follows we refer to the term "quality leader" to denote the firm that produces
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the current state-of-the-art quality product. We will call "half-idea follower", or simply
the follower, any R&D firm that owns the first half-idea invented in order to introduce,
in the second stage, the product’s innovation that pushes up the quality ladder. Finally,
we let the term "outsider" denote each R&D firm that tries to invent a new first half
idea in the basic research sector (i.e. tries to become the new follower). We assume that
firms are able to instantaneously patent both the inventive half-idea and the product
innovation. Then, patent protection may determine a monopolistic position both in the
applied R&D sector and in the final good sector, and the winner of the final patent R&D
race becomes the sole producer of a jt(ω) + 1 quality consumption product. Research
firms rationally choose at which stage of the innovation process to settle in by simply
comparing the expected benefits of their R&D eﬀorts and their corresponding costs.
Time is continuous with an unbounded horizon and there is a continuum of infinitely-
lived dynasties of expanding households with identical intertemporally additive prefer-
ences. Heterogeneous labour, skilled and unskilled, is the only factor of production. Both
labour markets are assumed perfectly competitive. In the final good sectors ω ∈ [0, 1]mo-
nopolistically competitive firms produce diﬀerentiated consumption goods by combining
skilled and unskilled labour, whereas research firms employ only skilled labour.
2.2 Households
Time t ≥ 0 population P (t) is assumed growing at rate g > 0 and its initial level
is normalized to 1. The representative household’s preferences are represented by the
following intertemporal utility function:
U = E0
∙Z ∞
0
egte−ρtu (t) dt
¸
, (1)
where ρ > g is the subjective discount rate and E0 denotes the expectation operator as
of time t = 0. Instantaneous utility u (t) is defined as:
u (t) =
Z 1
0
ln
"X
j
γjdjt (ω)
#
dω, (2)
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where djt (ω) is the quantity consumed of a good of quality j (that is, a product that
underwent j quality jumps) and produced in industry ω at time t. Assume that j is
forced to assume integer values6. Parameter γ > 1 measures the size of the quality
upgrades (i.e., the magnitude of innovations). This formulation, the same as Grossman
and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom (1991), assumes that each consumer prefers higher
quality products.
The representative consumer is endowed with L > 0 units of skilled labor andM > 0
units of unskilled labor summing to 1. Since labour bears no disutility it will be inelasti-
cally supplied for any level of non negative wages. Since initial population is normalized
to 1, L andM will also equal, in equilibrium, the percapita supply of skilled, respectively,
unskilled labour. Unskilled labor can only be employed in the final goods production.
Skilled labour is the most versatile, being also able to perform R&D activities.
In the first step of the consumer’s dynamic maximization problem, she selects the set
Jt(ω) of the existing quality levels with the lowest quality-adjusted prices. Then, at each
instant, the households allocate their income to maximize the instantaneous utility (2)
taking product prices as given in the following static (instantaneous) constraint equation:
E(t) =
Z 1
0
X
j∈Jt(ω)
pjt(ω)djt (ω) dω. (3)
Here E(t) denotes percapita consumption expenditure and pjt(ω) is the price of a
product of quality j produced in industry ω at time t. Let us define j∗t (ω) ≡ max {j : j ∈ Jt(ω)}
Using the instantaneous optimization results, we can re-write (2) as
u (t) =
Z 1
0
ln
£
γj
∗
t (ω)E(t)/pj∗t (ω)t(ω)
¤
dω = (4)
= ln[E(t)] + ln(γ)
Z 1
0
j∗t (ω)dω −
Z 1
0
ln[pj∗t (ω)t(ω)]dω (5)
6This assumption is common in the quality-ladder endogenous growth literature; still, in our frame-
work, it has the meaning of explicitly stating that half-ideas discoveries do not aﬀect consumer’s utility.
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The solution to this maximization problem yields the static demand function:
djt(ω) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
E(t)/pjt(ω) for j = j∗t (ω)
0 otherwise.
(6)
Only the good with the lowest quality-adjusted price is consumed, since there is no
demand for any other good. We also assume, as usual, that if two products have the
same quality-adjusted price, consumers will buy the higher quality product - although
they are formally indiﬀerent between the two products - because the quality leader can
always slightly lower the price of its product and drive the rivals out of the market.
Therefore, given the independent and - in equilibrium and by the law of large number
- deterministic evolution of the quality jumps and prices, the consumer will only choose
the piecewise continuous expenditure trajectory, E(·), that maximizes the following func-
tional
U =
Z ∞
0
e−(ρ−g)t ln[E(t)]dt. (7)
Assume that all consumers possess equal shares of all firms7 at time t = 0. Letting A(0)
denote the present value of human capital plus the present value of asset holdings at
t = 0, each individual’s intertemporal budget constraint is:
Z ∞
0
e−R(t)E(t)dt 5 A(0) (8)
where R(t) =
R t
0
r(s)ds represents the equilibrium cumulative real interest rate up to
time t .
Finally, the representative consumer chooses the time pattern of consumption expen-
7It may be pointed out the diﬃculty in reconciling the hypothesis of consumers’ owning equal shares
of all firms with this Schumpeterian framework. Since there is a continuum of structurally identical
industries, each consumer can diversify completely the industry-specific risk associated with the discovery
of higher quality products. Thus, as creative destruction determines a sequence of monopolistic positions
by R&D firms, forward looking consumers should be induced to carefully evaluate each research project
in order to optimize the return-risk profile of their asset portfolio. Neverthless, the Cobb-Douglas
specification adopted for the istantaneous utiliy function, by satisfying the Gorman conditions, allows
this model to admit a representative consumer representation regardless of the initial wealth distribution.
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diture to maximize (7) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (8). The optimal
expenditure trajectory satisfies the Euler equation:
E˙(t)/E(t) = r(t)− (ρ− g) (9)
where r(t) = R˙(t) is the instantaneous market interest rate at time t.
Euler equation (9) implies that a constant (steady state) per-capita consumption
expenditure is optimal when the instantaneous market interest rate equals the consumer’s
subjective discount rate. Since preferences are homothetic, in each industry aggregate
demand is proportional to the representative consumer’s one. E denotes the aggregate
consumption spending and d denotes the aggregate demand.
2.3 Production
In this section we examine the production side of the economy. We assume constant
returns to scale technologies in the (diﬀerentiated) manufacturing sectors represented by
the following production functions:
y (ω) = Xα (ω)M1−α (ω) , for all ω ∈ [0, 1], (10)
where α ∈ (0, 1), y (ω) is the output flow per unit time, X (ω) andM (ω) are, respec-
tively, the skilled and unskilled labour employment flows in industry ω ∈ [0, 1]. Letting
ws and wu denote the skilled and unskilled wage rates, in each industry the quality leader
seeks to minimize its total cost flow C = wsX (ω) +wuM (ω) subject to constraint (10).
For y (ω) = 1, the solution to this minimization problem yields the conditional unskilled
(11) and skilled (12) labour demands (i.e. the per-unit labour requirements):
M (ω) =
µ
1− α
α
¶αµws
wu
¶α
, (11)
X (ω) =
µ
α
1− α
¶1−αµwu
ws
¶1−α
. (12)
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Thus the (minimum) cost function is:
C(ws, wu, y) = c(ws, wu)y (13)
where c(ws, wu) is the per-unit cost function:
c(ws, wu) =
h¡
1−α
α
¢−(1−α)
+
¡
α
1−α
¢−αi
wαsw
1−α
u . (14)
Since unskilled labour is uniquely employed in the final good sectors and all price
variables (including wages) are assumed to instantaneously adjust to their market clearing
values, unskilled labour aggregate demand
R 1
0
M (ω) dω is equal to its aggregate supply,
MP (t), at any date. Since industries are symmetric and their number is normalized to
1, in equilibrium8 M (ω) =MP (t).
Letting wu = 1, from equations (11) and (12) we get the firm’s skilled labour demand
negatively depending on skilled (/unskilled) wage (ratio):
X(ω) =
1
ws
µ
α
1− α
¶
MP (t) (15)
In percapita terms,
x(ω) ≡ X(ω)
P (t)
=
1
ws
µ
α
1− α
¶
M . (16)
In each industry, at each instant, firms compete in prices. Given demand function
(6), within each industry product innovation is non-drastic9, hence the quality leader will
fix its (limit) price by charging a mark-up γ over the unit cost (remember that parameter
γ measures the size of product quality jumps).
8More generally, with mass N > 0 of final good industries, in equilibrium M (ω) = MP (t)N .
9We are following Aghion and Howitt’s (1992) and (1998) definition of drastic innovation as generating
a suﬃciently large quality jump to allow the new monopolist to maximize profits without risking the re-
entry of the previous monopoly. Given the unit elastic demand, here the unconstrained profit maximizing
price would be infinitely high: that would induce the previous incumbent to re-enter.
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p = γc(ws, 1)⇒ d =
E
γc(ws, 1)
. (17)
Hence each monopolist earns a flow of profit, in percapita terms, equal to
π =
γ − 1
γ
E = (γ − 1)wsx
α
π = (γ − 1) 1
1− αM . (18)
From eq.s (18) follows:
γ − 1
γ
E = (γ − 1) 1
1− αM ⇒ E =
γ
1− αM . (19)
Interestingly, eq. (19) implies that in equilibrium total expenditure is always constant.
Therefore, eq. (9) implies a constant real interest rate:
r(t) = ρ− g ≡ r. (20)
2.4 R&D Sectors with Patentable Research Tools.
In each industry, the R&D activity is a step-by-step process by which, first a new
idea is invented and then it is used to find the way to introduce a higher quality product.
First half-idea are new, non-obvious, non-tradeable, patentable and necessary to get to
the product innovation: first half-ideas are research tools.
In this section, stylizing a post-1980 US scenario, we assume that once the half-idea is
invented it gets protected by an infinitely-lived patent. With this assumption we impose
the publicity of the state-of-the-art in every sector and exclude the possibility for an
outsider firm to lie by announcing a false half-idea finding in order to discourage its
competitors.
Following Aghion and Howitt (1998, Ch.7), we assume that each R&D firm faces a
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∪-shaped unit cost function10. Let i = F,O denote a follower and an outsider R&D firm
respectively, Ni , with i = F,O, indicates the mass of follower and, respectively, outsider
firms in each R&D sector. The individual firm’s Poisson process probability intensity to
succeed in inventing a half-idea or completing one (i.e. introducing the product innova-
tion) is θi (zi − φ,Ni, P (t)), increasing and concave in zi−φ ≥ 0, depending on the R&D
eﬀort zi in excess of the fixed cost, in terms of labour input, φ > 0, that each firm has
to pay per-unit time in order to engage in the R&D race. In particular, we specify the
per-unit time Poisson probability intensity to succeed for an outsider and a follower firm
respectively as
θO(zO − φ,NO, P (t)) ≡
λ0
P (t)
p
max(zO − φ, 0)
µ
NO
P (t)
¶−a
(21)
θF (zF − φ,NF , P (t)) ≡
λ1
P (t)
p
max(zF − φ, 0)
µ
NF
P (t)
¶−a
(22)
where λk > 0, k = 0, 1, are R&D laboratory productivity constants; Ni (i = O,F )
represent the number of laboratories in each industry and constant a > 0 is an inter-firm
intra-sectoral congestion parameter, capturing11 the risk of R&D duplications, knowledge
theft and other diseconomies of fragmentation in the R&D. Each Poisson process - with
arrival rates described by (21)-(22) - governing the assumed two-stage innovative process
is supposed to be independent across laboratories and across industries.
Eq.s (21)-(22) state that the probability intensity of the invention of a half-idea
decreases with population. This assumption, common to Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
(1999), captures the complexity of improving a good in a way that renders a larger pop-
ulation happier. Notice that also the congestion externality is assumed to decrease with
population, as we deem it reasonable that the risk of R&D duplications declines with the
10Assuming U -shaped R&D cost curves introduces some additional analytical complexity, but -beside
being more realistic than the usual linear private R&D technologies - deliver more robust equilibria
under diﬀerent institutional scenarios. This renders our framework useful for additional extensions. It
is interesting to point out that the square roots are not necessary: any exponent between 0 and 1 would
work.
11As, for example, in Romer’s (1990) specification of the R&D technology.
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diﬃculty of duplications, that the industrial espionage activities are rendered more com-
plicated with the technological complexity of the ideas being targeted, etc. The specific
form postulated for our assumption of increasing technological complexity is suﬃcient
to guarantee that the equilibrium long run percapita growth rates do not increase with
population, thereby rendering our model immune to the embarrassing strong scale ef-
fect (Jones 2003) that plagued the early generation endogenous growth models, without
leading to "semi-endogenous" growth (Jones 1995, Segerstrom 1998).
From the Poisson process proprieties, the probability of simultaneously inventing two
half-ideas in a tiny interval of time of duration ∆t is a zero of order higher than the
first. If instead an outsider R&D firm invents a second half-idea after the inventor of
a first half-idea has already been granted a patent, the patent oﬃce will not grant a
second patent on that half-idea, based on the legal principle of patentability requirement
(O’Donoghue 1998, O’Donoghue and Zweimueller, 2003), because the second half-idea
does not promise to generate further utility gains to the consumer. Therefore no second
R&D firm will ever invest resources in inventing a half-idea on which it will not be able to
claim intellectual property rights. As a result, no industry has more than one follower and
the whole set of industries ω ∈ [0, 1] gets partitioned into two sets of industries: industries
ω ∈ A0 (temporarily) with no half-ideas and, therefore, with one quality leader (the final
product patent holder), no followers and a mass of outsider firms, and the industries
ω ∈ A1 = [0, 1]\ A0 industries, with one half-idea and, therefore, one half-idea leader
(the final product patent holder) and one follower (the half-idea patent holder). Firms
engage in basic R&D only in ω ∈ A0 industries and engage in applied R&D activity aimed
at a direct product innovation only in A1 industries. When a quality improvement occurs
in an industry the half-idea follower becomes the new quality leader and the industry
switches from A1 to A0. When an inventive half-idea discovery arises in an industry
ω ∈ A0 this industry switches to A1 and the winner of the first-stage patent race is the
new follower. Figure 1 illustrates the flow of industries from a condition to the other:
Insert Figure 1
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Notice that the two sets A0 and A1 change over time, even if the economy will eventu-
ally admit a steady state. At any instant we can measure the mass of industries without
any half-idea as m(A0) ∈ [0, 1], and the mass of industries with an uncompleted half-idea
as m(A1) = 1−m(A0). Clearly, in a steady state these measures will be constant, as the
flows in and out will oﬀset each other. In light of the definitions so far, we can express
the skilled labor market equilibrium in percapita terms as:
L = x+m(A0)nOzO +m(A1)nF zF , (L
0
)
where nO ≡ NOP (t) and nF ≡
NF
P (t) are the percapita number of laboratories in each basic
and applied R&D sector. Eq. (L’) states that, at each date, the aggregate supply of
skilled labor, LP (t), finds employment in the manufacturing firms of all [0, 1] sectors, x,
and in the R&D firms of the A0 sectors, nOzO, and of the A1 sectors, nFzF .
The stock value of all firms is determined by privately arbitraging between risk free
consumption loans, firm bonds and equities, viewed as perfect substitutes also due to the
ability of financial intermediaries to perfectly diversify portfolios and eliminate risk12.
Letting VO, V 1F , V
0
L , and V
1
L denote respectively the present expected value of being an
outsider firm (VO), a half-idea follower (V 1F ), an A0 industry quality leader (V
0
L ) and
an A1 industry quality leader (V 1L ), costless arbitrage between risk free activities and
firms’ equities imply that at each instant the following Bellman’s equations must hold in
12Hence, despite individuals’ being risk averse, average returns will be deterministic, the risk premia
will be zero, and agents will only compare expected returns. As usual in this class of models, we invoke
the law of large numbers, which allows individuals who invest in a continuum of sectors with idiosyncratic
risk, thereby transforming probabilities into frequencies.
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equilibrium:
rVO = max
zO
λ0
P (t)
p
zO − φ
µ
NO
P (t)
¶−a
(VF − VO)− wszO +
dVO
dt
(23a)
rVF = max
NF ,zF
NFλ1
P (t)
p
zF − φ
µ
NF
P (t)
¶−a
(V 0L − VF )− wsNFzF +
dVF
dt
(23b)
rV 0L = πP (t)−
µ
NO
P (t)
¶1−a
λ0
p
zO − φ
¡
V 0L − V 1L
¢
+
dV 0L
dt
(23c)
rV 1L = πP (t)−
µ
NF
P (t)
¶1−a
λ1
p
zF − φV 1L +
dV 1L
dt
(23d)
Equation (23a) states that the risk free income deriving from the liquidation of the
expected present value of an outsider R&D firm in an A0 industry, rVO, is equal to the
expected gain from becoming a follower, λ0P (t)
√
zO − φ
³
NO
P (t)
´−a
(VF − VO), i.e. the patent
holder of the next half-idea in an A1, industry minus the R&D expenditure, wszO, plus
the gradual stock market appreciation in the case of the half-idea not arriving, dVOdt .
Equation (23b) equals the risk free income deriving from the liquidation of the ex-
pected present value of the follower in an A1 industry, rVF , and the expected increase in
value from becoming a quality leader (i.e. completing the product innovation process),
λ1
³
NF
P (t)
´1−a√
zF − φ(V 0L−VF ), minus the relative R&D cost, wsNFzF 13, plus the gradual
appreciation in the case of R&D success not arriving, dVFdt .
Equation (23c) states that the risk free income deriving from the liquidation of the
stock market value of a leader in an A0 industry, rV 0L , equals the flow of profit π minus
the capital loss from being challenged by a half-idea on a better product in the case a
follower appears,
³
NO
P (t)
´1−a
λ0
√
zO − φ (V 0L − V 1L ), plus gradual appreciation in the case
of such event not occurring, dV
0
L
dt .
Finally, equation (23d) equals the risk free income deriving from the liquidation of
13The reader may note that, by making the assumption that the patent holder of a research tool, i.e. a
first half-idea follower, can run any number of R&D laboratories and/or license its patent to any number
of R&D firms (the licensee of the patent for the research tool is the only one who can use it to invent
a completed new product), the patent holder is able to appropriate the profits potentially generated by
its half-idea in its industry without incurring in the strong decreasing returns to laboratory size implied
by our assumed inverse-U shaped laboratory unit cost curve.
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the stock market value of a leader in an A1 industry, rV 1L , and the relative flow of profit
π minus the expected loss deriving from the follower’s success, λ1
³
NF
P (t)
´1−a√
zF − φV 1L ,
plus the gradual appreciation if obsolescence does not occur, dV
1
L
dt .
Each perfectly competitive outsider firm determines the amount of labour devoted to
basic research z∗O by trying to maximize its expected profit flow.
Lemma 1 a) The equilibrium amount of skilled labour employed by each outsider
R&D firm in each A0 industry is z∗O = 2φ.
b) The positive R&D equilibrium value of the skilled wage ratio is ws = max
Ã
λ0
VF
P (t)

NO
P (t)
−a
2
√
φ , 1
!
.
Proof (in Appendix 1.A).
Interestingly, unlike the usual features of previous quality ladders models, in this
model, due to decreasing returns at the industry level, there is no indeterminacy in the
intersector allocation of R&D labor14.
Let us now turn to the follower’s problem. Problem (23b)’s first order conditions are:
³
NF
P (t)
´1−a
λ1(V 0L − VF )
2
√
zF − φ
= wsNF
(1− a)
µ
NF
P (t)
¶−a λ1
P (t)
p
zF − φ(V 0L − VF ) = wszF ,
which imply that the following Lemma 2 holds:
Lemma 2 The equilibrium amount of skilled labour employed in each R&D follower
laboratory and the equilibrium number of laboratories in each A1 industry are
z∗F = 2φ
1− a
1− 2a (24)
N∗F =
⎡
⎣ λ1(V
0
L − VF )
P (t)2ws
q
φ
1−2a
⎤
⎦
1
a
P (t). (25)
14See Cozzi (2006) for a proof of indeterminacy in quality ladders models.
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It is interesting to note that the patent holder is using its research tool in a small
enough number of R&D laboratories so that its R&D industry congestion is fully inter-
nalized.
Defining the per-capita stock market value of firms as v0L ≡
V 0L
P (t) and vF ≡
VF
P (t) , we
can write:
n∗F =
⎡
⎣λ1(v
0
L − vF )
2ws
q
φ
1−2a
⎤
⎦
1
a
. (26)
Plugging eq.s (16) and (18) into the expression of the skilled labour wage ratio
(Lemma 1b)) and using percapita notation, we obtain
x =
1
ws
µ
α
1− α
¶
M = min
µ
2
√
φ
λ0vFn
−a
O
, 1
¶µ
α
1− α
¶
M . (27)
Therefore the (percapita) skilled labor employment in the manufacturing sector is
inversely related to the market value of half-patented ideas. In fact, higher valued re-
search tools draw more skilled labor from the manufacturing plants into the basic re-
search laboratories, thereby increasing the manufacturing unskilled/skilled labor ratio
and consequently raising skilled labor marginal productivity and the relative wage. Since
the patent on a half-idea does not derive value from the direct production of a mar-
ketable good, V 1F is in turn pinned down by V
0
L . Therefore, the equilibrium value of
the skilled wage is indirectly related to the stream of profits expected from the future
commercialization of the product of the completed idea. Unlike the traditional Schum-
peterian innovative process, the skilled wage here does not immediately incorporate the
discounted expected value of the next commercially fruitful patent, but it does so only
one step ahead: the value of the future monopolist is scaled down to current R&D labor
wage by the composition of two innovation probabilities.
Let us remind that the skilled labor market clearing condition states:
m(A0)n∗Oz
∗
O + (1−m(A0))n∗Fz∗F + x = L (28)
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Hence, since wages are pinned down by the optimal firm size and by the zero profit
conditions in the perfectly competitive basic R&D labor markets, the unique equilibrium
per-sector mass of entrant basic R&D firms consistent with skilled labor market clearing
(28) is determined by solving equation (28) for nO:
n∗O =
L− x− (1−m(A0)) φ1−2an∗F
2φm(A0)
, (29)
where we have used Lemma 1 (for z∗O = 2φ) and (24) for z
∗
F .
To complete our analysis, let us look more closely at the inter-industry dynamics
depicted by Figure 1. In the set of basic research industries a given number of perfectly
competitive (freely entered) outsider firms, NO, employ a flow of skilled labour input z∗O
to get a flow probability of becoming A1 followers, while in the set of innovative industries
each of the N∗F per-industry follower laboratories employs a flow of skilled labour input
z∗F to obtain a flow probability to succeed in implementing the state-of-the-art research
level. The flows of probability, i.e. the per-unit time probabilities, for the individual firm
to pass from A0 to A1 and from A1 to A0, at the aggregate level, become deterministic
frequencies of industries flowing from A0 to A1 and from A1 to A0. Hence the industrial
dynamics of this economy is described by the following first order ordinary diﬀerential
equation:
dm(A0)
dt
= (1−m(A0))NF
λ1
P (t)
µ
NF
P (t)
¶−ap
z∗F − φ−m(A0)
µ
NO
P (t)
¶−a
NO
λ0
p
z∗O − φ
P (t)
= (1−m(A0))λ1 (n∗F )
1−a
r
φ
1− 2a −m(A0) (n
∗
O)
1−a λ0
p
φ (30)
where in the second equality we have used Lemma 1 (for z∗O = 2φ) and (24) for
z∗F . Notice that our R&D technology assumption have allowed us to describe the dy-
namics of the fraction of sectors performing basic R&D only as a function of the mass of
population-adjusted per-industry R&D laboratories. To completely describe the equilib-
rium dynamics of our economy it is convenient to reduce the dimensionality of the system
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by considering only population-adjusted variables. After using (20) and simplifying, we
can rewrite eq.s (23b), (23c) and (23d) as
ρvF = (n∗F )
1−a λ1
r
φ
1− 2a(v
0
L − vF )− wsn∗F2φ
1− a
1− 2a +
dvF
dt
(31a)
ρv0L = π − (n∗O)
1−a λ0
p
φ
¡
v0L − v1L
¢
+
dv0L
dt
(31b)
ρv1L = π − (n∗F )
1−a λ1
r
φ
1− 2av
1
L +
dv1L
dt
(31c)
System (31a), (31b), (31c) and eq. (30) - jointly with cross equation restrictions (27)
and (29) - form a system of four first order ordinary diﬀerential equations, whose solution
describes the dynamics of this economy for any admissible initial value of the unknown
functions of time v0L, v
1
L,vF , and m(A0). In a steady state,
dv1L
dt =
dv0L
dt =
dvF
dt =
dm(A0)
dt = 0.
Given the analytical complexity of such system we resorted to numerical analysis15.
In all numerical simulations, the steady state exists, it is unique and it is saddle point
stable for any set of parameter values. In particular, we obtain a unique economically
meaningful equilibrium, and the uniqueness of the equilibrium is (locally) guaranteed
because the linear approximation around the steady state has three unstable manifolds -
associated with market variables v0L, v
1
L, and vF - and one stable manifold - associated with
predetermined variable m(A0). In fact, in all our computations the Jacobian of system
(31a), (31b), (31c) and eq. (30) computed at the steady state has three eigenvalues
with positive real parts and one eigenvalue with negative real part. Therefore, given an
initial condition for m(A0), there is (locally) only one initial condition for v0L, v
1
L, and vF
such that the generated trajectory tends to the steady state vector: the equilibrium is
determinate.
2.5 R&D Sectors with Unpatentable Research tools.
In this section we drop the assumption of patentable basic scientific results, in or-
der to depict a pre-1980 US normative environment and/or a current European patent
15The files .mod used to simulate the model in Matlab are available from the authors on request.
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regime. Lacking the patent protection of the first half-ideas, the innovative process would
need to resort to non-profit motivated R&D organizations to take place: publicly funded
universities and laboratories have often been motivated by the induced scientific spillover
on potentially marketable future technical applications.
This section also introduces a particular behavioral rule for public researchers: we
assume that public researchers are not perfectly mobile across sectors, so that when in a
sector ω that lacked a half-idea, i.e. belonged to A0, a half-idea appears, i.e. it becomes
A1, the public R&D workers keep carrying out basic research in that sector. Given our
technological assumptions, this behavior will likely lead to the discovery of a second half-
idea in sector ω that is redundant from the economic view point. This may represent the
case of university researchers who keep investigating along intellectual trajectories even
when they know that no private firm will ever profit from adapting to their market the
new knowledge they may create. Unguided by the invisible hand, researchers will keep
devoting their eﬀorts proving that they are able to invent a second, third, ..., nth genial
- but socially useless - idea to enrich their cv and their academic carrier opportunities.
Hence, we will assume from here on that the public researchers are allocated across
diﬀerent industries according to a uniform distribution. This assumption emphasizes the
role of markets to give R&D laboratories the right incentives to divert their resources
from the unprofitable sectors and to quickly reallocate them towards more profitable
aims.
We also make the assumption that the government chooses the fraction, L¯G ∈ [0, L],
of population of skilled workers to be allocated to the heterogenous research activities
conducted by universities and other scientific institutions. The government basic R&D
expenditure, equal to P (t)L¯Gws, is funded by lump sum per-capita taxes on consumers.
The assumption of lump sum taxation guarantees that government R&D expenditure
does not imply additional distortions on private decisions. This allows us to use the
previous notation and derivations also for the case of a balanced government budget
taxing all households in order to transfer the tax proceeds to the basic R&D workers.
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The optimizing behavior of the public sector consists of maximizing the expected flow
of half-ideas per sector with respect to the intensity of basic research eﬀort zG, that is
the government chooses the optimal scale for the public laboratories.
The fixed percapita amount of skilled workers, L¯G, hired in the basic public R&D
is equal to the intensity of basic research eﬀort, zG, multiplied by the number of public
laboratories, NG, i.e.:
P (t)L¯G = NGzG. (32)
In percapita terms,
L¯G =
NG
P (t)
≡ nGzG. (33)
Lemma 3 The solution of the public sector maximization problem is z∗G = 2φ
1−a
1−2a .
Proof (in Appendix 1.B).
Therefore, solving eq. (33) for nG and substituting the solution of the government
maximization problem, we have:
nG =
L¯G
2φ 1−a
1−2a
. (34)
The financial arbitrage implies the following market valuations of each sector’s un-
challenged16 leader firm, V 0L , directly challenged leader firm, V
1
L , and follower R&D firm
16We here mean "unchallenged" by a follower. However, a monopolist in an A0 industry is indirectly
challenged by the basic R&D laboratories trying to invent a new half-idea on which future follower firms
will work to render it obsolete.
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VF 17:
rV 0L = πP (t)−
µ
NG
P (t)
¶1−a
λ0
p
zG − φ
¡
V 0L − V 1L
¢
+
dV 0L
dt
(35a)
rV 1L = πP (t)− λ1
µ
NF
P (t)
¶1−ap
zF − φV 1L +
dV 1L
dt
(35b)
rVF = max
zF
λ1
P (t)
µ
NF
P (t)
¶−ap
zF − φ
¡
V 0L − VF
¢
− wszF +
dVF
dt
(35c)
Plugging eq. (34) and the optimal size of public laboratories as given in Lemma 3
into (35a) and using percapita variables - as in the last section - allow us to rewrite the
equation of leader’s financial arbitrage as:
ρv0L = π −
Ã
L¯G
2φ 1−a
1−2a
!1−a
λ0
r
φ
1− 2a
¡
v0L − v1L
¢
+
dv0L
dt
. (36)
Solving Bellman eq. (35c) and setting (as a consequence of free entry into the applied
R&D sector) VF = 0, we get the flow of research labor hired by each follower, z∗F = 2φ.
Hence, the previous system (35a)-(35c) can be rewritten in percapita terms as:
rv0L = (γ − 1)
1
1− αM −
Ã
L¯G
2φ 1−a
1−2a
!1−a
λ0
r
φ
1− 2a
¡
v0L − v1L
¢
+
dv0L
dt
rv1L = (γ − 1)
1
1− αM − λ1n
1−a
F
p
φv1L +
dv1L
dt
0 = λ1
p
φv0Ln
−a
F − ws2φ (37a)
17Notice that λ0
³
NG
P (t)
´1−a√
zG − φ captures the expected partial obsolescence of unchallenged lead-
ership in each A0 sector, λ1
³
NF
P (t)
´1−a√
zF − φ the expected final obsolescence of directly challenged
leadership in each sector A1, and λ1P (t)n
−a
F
√
zF − φ the probability per unit time that a single follower
succeeds in each sector A1.
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From eq. (37a), we can solve for the skilled/unskilled wage ratio, getting:
ws = max
µ
λ1v0L
2
√
φ
n−aF , 1
¶
. (38)
Let us remember that, from the final production analysis, we have:
x =
1
ws
µ
α
1− α
¶
M . (39)
The dynamics of the industries is now described by the following first order ordinary
diﬀerential equation:
dm(A0)
dt
= (1−m(A0))NF
λ1
P (t)
µ
NF
P (t)
¶−ap
z∗F − φ−m(A0)NG
λ0
P (t)
µ
NG
P (t)
¶−ap
z∗G − φ =
= (1−m(A0))n1−aF λ1
p
φ−m(A0)
Ã
L¯G
2φ 1−a
1−2a
!1−a
λ0
r
φ
1− 2a . (40)
From the skilled labor market clearing condition
x+ L¯G + (1−m(A0))nF2φ = L, (41)
we get to the equilibrium mass of per-sector followers:
nF =
L− 1ws
¡
α
1−α
¢
M − L¯G
2φ(1−m(A0))
, m(A0) ∈ [0, 1]. (42)
In the stationary distribution dm(A0)dt = 0. Therefore the flow of industries entering the
A0 group must equal the flow of industries entering the A1 group. Given the complexity
of our problem, also in this case we performed numerical simulations in Matlab18. In all
simulations a unique economically meaningful steady state equilibrium exists and it is
determinate.
3. Comparing the Diﬀerent Intellectual Property Regimes.
18The files .mod used to simulate the model in Matlab are available from the authors on request.
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This section draws the implications of the two intellectual property scenarios we have
depicted in the previous sections. To compare the two diﬀerent regimes, we assume that in
the scenarios with unpatentable research tools the government chooses the same amount
of basic R&D that the private economy would generate in equilibrium. This allows us
to compare the diﬀerent ineﬃciencies after controlling for the public R&D employment
level.
A first analytical result is expressed by the following:
Proposition 1: If the congestion externality is very small, i.e. a → 0, the equilibrium
innovation rate of the private economy with patentable research tools is higher than the
equilibrium innovation rate of the economy with unpatentable research tools.
Proof ( in Appendix 1.C).
As a result of Proposition 1, we can expect that if the information and communication
technologies permit a high level of coordination of the investigations in the research
community and trade secret laws eﬀectively discourage ideas misappropriation19, the
social costs of a public research system that lacks economic incentives to invent new
potentially useful ideas are higher than the shortcomings stemming from monopolistic
applied R&D.
The following also holds:
Proposition 2 : If relative applied R&D productivity parameter λ1 is very large, the
equilibrium innovation rate of the private economy with patentable research tools is lower
than the equilibrium innovation rate of the economy with unpatentable research tools.
Proof ( in Appendix 1.C).
If it is relatively easy to find economic applications of scientific ideas, most of the
sectors will tend to lack basic ideas, whose applications rapidly exhaust. Therefore the
broadly focussed academic research by pure scientists uninterested in economic appli-
cations will turn out to be performing a useful service to the private R&D firms, by
19See Cozzi (2001) and Cozzi and Spinesi (2006) for models of economic growth with endogenous
industrial espionage.
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disclosing a large spectrum of potentially profitable innovations. Though blind to the in-
visible hand, the publicly run universities internalize their academic externalities and - if
applied R&D is simple enough or if basic research is diﬃcult enough - cause the economy
to reach a stronger innovative performance than if patenting the research tools discored
by uncoordinated basic R&D institutions were permitted. In fact, relatively high levels
of λ1 imply a large steady state level of m(A0), thereby minimizing the ineﬃciencies
of the public researchers (who keep researching as if their activity were needed in the
whole product space), compared to the social costs of the monopolistic production (by
the research tools patent holders) of the applied R&D success probabilities.
Proposition 2 suggests that a public innovation infrastructure poor of selective eco-
nomic incentives could have been acceptable in a world in which the industrial applica-
tions of basic scientific discoveries were rather straightforward. In the modern industry,
in which applications of science are eagerly searched by often highly sophisticated re-
searchers, curing the ineﬃciencies of basic research may become the top priority for a
steadily growing economy. This may have motivated the switch in the US patenting rules
in the early Eighties and at the same time may provide an explanation for the growing
relative disadvantage of the European system of innovation, in which the patentability
of research tools is not allowed.
Though lacking a general analytical result, all our numerical simulations of the two
models of this paper show that, even at moderate levels of the congestion externality, the
economy where research tools are patentable and basic R&D is privately carried out can
lead to more innovation than an economy in which the public basic research is conducted
in an inertial way. This happens when the applied R&D productivity parameter, λ1,
becomes very low: in such cases the equilibrium innovative performance of the private
economy with patentable research tools becomes better than the equilibrium growth
performance of the economy with a public R&D sector. In fact, if λ1 is very small then
m(A0) will be small, thereby exalting the wasteful nature of the public R&D activity in
[0, 1]−A0: in this case the social cost of a public R&D blind to the social needs signalled
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by the invisible hand would overwhelm the social costs of the restricted entry into the
applied R&D sector induced by the patentability of research tools.
Table 1 in Appendix 2, built by simulating the model for constant values of all para-
meters excepted λ1, summarizes the economy’s functioning for diﬀerent values of applied
R&D productivity in the two diﬀerent intellectual property regimes. Table 1 provides an
example that as λ1 becomes very low the innovation rate in the scenario where research
tools are patentable overcomes the equilibrium growth performance of the economy with
a public R&D sector.
Figure 2, built on the data provided in Table 1, shows that for suﬃciently low levels
(below 1.7) of relative applied R&D productivity parameter λ1, the innovation rate of
the economy where research tools are patentable and basic R&D is privately carried out
may overcome the innovation rate of the economy with unpatentable research tools.
Insert Figure 2
Among the diﬀerent forms of intellectual property protection, patents constitute the
most common way to allow the inventors to appropriate the economic potential from the
inventions20. For this reason, patent data are often used by the economists as indicators
for the innovative performance of the economic system21.
Insert Figure 3
Figure 3 represents the total U.S. patent grants divided by the U.S. inflation adjusted
applied R&D expenditure. It is easily seen that in the U.S. the ratio of the patents
granted each year to US residents on applied R&D expenditure per year (in year 2000
20Teece (2000) remaks that "Patents are in one sense the strongest form of intellectual property because
they grant the ability to exclude, wherease copyrights and trade secrets do not prevent firms that make
indipendent but duplicative discoveries from practicing their innovations and inventions."
21For a survey on the literature on patent statistics see Griliches (1990).
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dollars) decreased by about four fifths from 1953 to 1982. This confirms the existence of
an increasing complexity in the application of the basic scientific results for commercial
purposes. Such patents to R&D ratio is an index of applied research productivity. We
can view it as an alternative index to our parameter λ1.
5. Calibrating the Model
In this section we calibrate our model with U.S. data from 1973 to 197922. Our
exercise, among other things, will allow to obtain an estimation of the complexity of
basic R&D, as summarized, inversely, by our parameter λ0, whose evolution cannot be
inferred by patent statistics, because in the Seventies basic R&D outcomes could not be
patented even in the US.
In our calibrations we use the number of patents granted to U.S. residents - expressed
in millions - for the years 1973, 1975, 1977, and 1979, as well as the data for the skilled
and unskilled full time equivalent workers, mark ups, etc. to compute, for each year, the
values of λ0 and λ1which generate the observed numbers as the steady state equilibria23.
The value of the mark-up has been set equal to 1.68, consistently with estimates of Roeger
(1995) and Martins et al. (1996). The values of the skill premium are taken from Krusell
et al. (2000). Free parameters α, a and φ have been fixed, respectively, to values24 0.1,
0.2 and 100. Also, we set the subjective rate of time preference to 0.05 throughout this
period. Since we have purged our model from the scale eﬀect, in the population-adjusted
Bellman’s equation the population growth rate disappeared, thereby waving the need to
give a value for it.
By solving for the steady state values of the endogenous variables in a way consistent
22The data for L¯G National Science Board (2006) "S&E doctorate holders in research
university and other academic istitutions". Calibrations also include data for the U.S.
skilled (completed four years of college or more) (/unskilled) labour employment available at
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/education/tabA-2.xls.
23Our decision to use the data only for the odd years is motivated by data availability. However, since
we rely on the steady state computations, we think it reasonable to allow for a two year transition to
the steady state rather than just one year.
24Though these choices are admittedly arbitrary and motivated by the facility of convergence, we tried
several other parameter values without modifying the ordering of results.
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with the data we are able to get the values for the applied R&D productivity, λ1, listed
for each year in the following Figure 4
Insert Figure 4
and for the basic R&D productivity; λ0, listed for each year in Figure 5:
Insert Figure 5
As the reader can notice, during the Seventies R&D complexity increased in both
basic and applied R&D. Hence, in principle, the relative advantage for the patentability
of research tools over the public basic R&D system is ambiguous. Therefore, we have
used the previously described values of the technological parameters and of the population
composition to compute the hypothetical steady state equilibrium for each year for the
alternative scenario (with patentable research tools) and compared its growth rate with
the growth rate that a public system would deliver after controlling for the diﬀerent
endogenous basic R&D labor. The following Figure 6 lists the comparative growth rates
in the two scenarios:
Insert Figure 6
We can notice from Figure 6 that the eﬀect of the decrease in the productivity of
applied R&D overwhelmed the increasing complexity in the basic R&D. Throughout the
decade the unpatentability of the basic scientific findings imposed an ineﬃciency to the
US innovation system. Moreover, the growth rate gap tended to increase over time.
If policy makers or the courts were aware of this kind of ineﬃciency they would have
accelerated the patentability of research tools, which anyway prevailed at the beginning
of the Eighties. Therefore we can consider the policy change in favour of the research
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tools patentability occurred in the United States from the early Eighties as the rational
political reaction to a decrease in the applied R&D productivity.
One could wonder why the increase in the applied R&D diﬃculty did not bring about
a decrease in the U.S. applied R&D expenditure. Our model suggests that the expansion
of basic research, resulting from non-profit motivated decisions by public authorities and
other entities, associated to the increase in L¯G, from 14% of the total U.S. employment
in 1973 to 16% of the total U.S. employment in 1979, allowed the generation of enough
half ideas to induce the observed increase in the private applied R&D employment.
6. Final Remarks
This paper developed a general equilibrium R&D-driven growth model in which the
innovation process is decomposed into two successive innovative stages. The extension of
multisector Schumpeterian models to such a more realistic dimension allows us to answer
a question about the US policy shift towards the extension of patentability to research
tools and basic scientific ideas. These normative innovations have been modifying the
industrial and academic lives in the last two decades. Our calibration suggests that one
of the reasons why they were eﬃciently introduced was the increased relative diﬃculty
in the marketable applications of basic scientific discoveries.
As the chances of finding profitable economic applications of each scientific result get
more and more remote, a larger number of industries need to be endowed with basic ideas
to try to build upon, which means that the scientists should focus their research energies
in the sectors where important scientific results are still lagging. This social need is less
likely met by academic researchers whose carriers proceed when they show themselves
able to discover theoretical results regardless of the potential commercial profits that
applied R&D firms may make by building on their inventions.
The analysis carried out in this paper should be extended in order to fully grasp the
complexity of the problem on which we tried to cast some light. For example, we can
notice that governments often have several policy tools at their disposal: hence their
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choice is not merely infinite patents versus public laboratories. There are subsidies, finite
patent lives - modeled, for example, by a constant probability of the patent lapsing, as
in Grossman and Lai, (2004) - as well as other importation ways to design the rewards
to the innovative activities. In particular, the classical Michael Kremer’s (1998) idea of
patent buyouts could be incorporated into the general equilibrium framework laid down
by this paper. In the case of the polymerase chain reaction or other really valuable basic
ideas where the monopoly mark-up is a severe distortion, it seems like buyouts could
be especially useful. Therefore in future works it would be potentially very fruitful to
try to incorporate the refinements investigated in the more specialized microeconomic
literature on rewarding sequential innovation with heterogeneous agents and asymmetric
information, such as Hopenhayn, Llobet and Mitchell (2006).
Bibliography
Aghion, P., Harris, C. and Vickers, J. (1997), “Competition and Growth with
Step-by-Step Innovation: An Example”, European Economic Review, vol. 41,
pp. 771-782 ;
Aghion, P., Dewatripont, M. and Stein, J.C. (2005), “Academia, the Private
Sector, and the Process of Innovation”, NBER working paper;
Aghion, P. and Howitt, P. (1992), “A Model of Growth through Creative
Destruction”, Econometrica 60 (2), pp. 323-351;
Aghion, P. and Howitt, P. (1998), “Endogenous Growth Theory”, MIT Press;
Cozzi, G. (2001), “Inventing or Spying? Implications for Growth”, Journal
of Economic Growth, March;
Cozzi, G. and L. Spinesi (2006), “Intellectual Appropriability, Product Diﬀer-
entiation, and Growth”, Macroeconomic Dynamics, vol. 10, n. 1, February;
Cozzi, G. (2006), “Self-fulfilling Prophecies in the Quality Ladders Economy",
Journal of Development Economics, forthcoming;
31
Dinopoulos, E. and Segerstom, P.S., (1999), "A Schumpeterian Model of Pro-
tection and Relative Wages", American Economic Review, pp. 450-472 ;
Gambardella, A. (1995). "Science and Innovation: The US Pharmaceutical
Industry in the 1980s." Cambridge (MA): Cambridge University Press.
Griliches, Z. (1990), "Patent Statistics and as Economic Indicators: A Sur-
vey", Journal of Economic Literature, 18(4), pp. 1661-1707.
Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. (1991), “Quality Ladders in the Theory of
Growth”, Review of Economic Studies 58, pp. 43-61 ;
Grossman, G.M. and Lai E.L. (2004) "International Protection of Intellectual
Property", American Economic Review, vol. 94, n.5.
Hecht J., (1999). City of Light: The Story of Fiber Optics. New York: Oxford
University Press;
Heller, M. and Eisemberg, R. (1998), "Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anti-Commons in Biomedical Research", Science, 280.
Henderson, R., L. Orsenigo, and G. Pisano (1999). “The Pharmaceutical
Industry and the Revolution in Molecular Biology: Interactions among Sci-
entific, Institutional and Organizational Change.” In Sources of Industrial
Leadership: Studies of Seven Industries, edited by D. C. Mowery and R. R.
Nelson, New York: Cambridge University Press;
Hopenhayn, H., G. Llobet and M. Mitchell (2006), "Rewarding Sequential
Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buy-outs", Journal of Political Economy,
vol.114, n. 6, pp.1041-1068;
Howitt, P. (1999), "Steady Endogenous Growth with Population and R&D
Inputs Growing", Journal of Political Economy, vol.107, n. 4, pp.715-30;
Jensen, R. and Thursby, M. (2001), "Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The
Licensing of University Inventions", American Economic Review, 91(1), pp.
32
240-59 ;
Jones, C., (1995) “R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth ”, Journal of
Political Economy, 1995, 103: 759-784 ;
Jones, C., (2003)”Growth in a World of Ideas”, Handbook of Economic
Growth, forthcoming.
Kortum, S. (1993), "Equilibrium R&D and the Decline of the Patent - R&D
Ratio: U.S. Evidence", American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings,
vol.65(5), pp.1389-1419;
Kortum, S. (1997), "Research, Patenting and Technological Change", Econo-
metrica, vol.83(2), pp.450-57;
Kremer, M. (1998), "Patent Buy-outs: a Mechanism for Encouraging Inno-
vation", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 113, No. 4, p. 1137-1167.
Krusell, P., L. Ohanian, J.V. Rios-Rull and G. Violante (2000): “Capital-Skill
Complementarity and Inequality”, Econometrica, 68:5, 1029-1054.
Lach, S. and Shankerman, M. (2003), “Incentives and invention in universi-
ties”, CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 3916, London, CEPR;
Martins, J. Scarpetta, S. and D. Pilat, (1996). ”Markup Pricing, Market
Structure and the Business Cycle”, OECD Economic Studies 27, 71-105;
National Research Council (2003). "Patents in the Knowledge-Based Econ-
omy", edited by W. M. Cohen and S. A. Merrill, Committee on Intellectual
Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based Economy, National Research Coun-
cil, Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.
National Research Council (2004). A Patent System for the 21ST Century.
edited by Merrill, S.A. Levin, R.C. and Myers, M.B., Washington, D.C.: The
National Academies Press.
33
National Science Board (2006) "Science and Engineering Indicators 2006".
Two volumes. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation;
O’Donoghue, T. (1998), "A Patentability Requirement for Sequential Inno-
vation," RAND Journal of Economics, 29(4), pp.654-679;
O’Donoghue, T., Scotchmer, S., and Thisse, J.F., (1998) “Patent Breadth,
Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress,” Journal of Economics
and Management Strategy, 7(1), pp.1-32;
O’Donoghue, T. and Zweimüller, J. (2004),“Patents in a Model of Endogenous
Growth”, Journal of Economic Growth, vol.9(1), pp.81-123 ;
Roeger, W. (1995). “Can Imperfect Competition Explain the Diﬀerence be-
tween Primal and Dual Productivity Measures? Estimates for US Manufac-
turing”, Journal of Political Economy 103, 2, 316-330;
Romer, P.M. (1990), “Endogenous Technological Change”, Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, vol.98, pp.S71-S102;
Scotchmer, S. (1991), "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
Research and the Patent Law", Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(1),29-
41;
Segerstrom, P.S. (1991), "Innovation, Imitation and Economic Growth", Jour-
nal of Political Economy, pp. 807-827;
Segerstrom, P.S. (1998), “Endogenous Growth Without Scale Eﬀects,” Amer-
ican Economic Review, vol. 88,n. 5, pp.1290-1310;
Teece, D.J. (2000), "Managing Intellectual Capital", Oxford University Press.
WIPO, 100 Years Protection of Intellectual Property Statistics, available on
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/.
Appendix
34
1.A - PROOF of Lemma 1.
a ) Consider the outsider ’s profit maximization problem in an A0 industry (eq. 21a
in text):
rVO = max
zO
λ0
P (t)
p
zO − φ
µ
NO
P (t)
¶−a ¡
V 1F − VO
¢
− wszO +
dVO
dt
. (43)
The first order condition for a maximum is:
λ0 (V 1F − VO)
2P (t)
√
zO − φ
µ
NO
P (t)
¶−a
= ws (44)
Since other outsider firms can freely enter each first half-idea patent race, in equilib-
rium the unskilled labor real wage will adjust so that expected profits will be annihilated
at the optimal firm size. Therefore in any equilibrium with positive R&D activity, the
stock value of every first half-idea R&D firm, VO, will be zero, and the average and
marginal product of research will be equal, i.e.
VO ≡ 0 implies:
dVO
dt
= 0 and λ0
p
zO − φ
V 1F
P (t)
µ
NO
P (t)
¶−a
= zOws. (45)
Solving (44) and the last eq. (45) for zO, we obtain the equilibrium amount of labour,
z∗O, employed by each outsider R&D firm:
z∗O = 2φ. (46)
b ) Plugging (46) into (45) allows us to find the positive R&D equilibrium value of
the skilled wage ratio as:
ws = max
⎛
⎜⎝
λ0
V 1F
P (t)
³
NO
P (t)
´−a
2
√
φ
, 1
⎞
⎟⎠ . (47)
In eq. (47) we have constrained the equilibrium skilled wage not to be lower than
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the unskilled wage, because otherwise the skilled workers would apply for unskilled jobs.
Notice that if the skilled wage were lower than the r.h.s. of (47) there would be excess
demand for skilled labor, because the freely entrant basic R&D firms would try to make
unboundedly high profits. Hence ws would immediately increase. If instead the wage
was higher than the r.h.s. of eq. (47) no basic R&D would be carried out, and eventually
no R&D at all. Unlike Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991),
such no growth path would never aﬄict the economy depicted in our model, because of
the assumed form of decreasing sectorial returns in each R&D sector.
Q.E.D.
1.B - PROOF of Lemma 3. From eq.(27) we have:
nG =
L¯G
zG
. (48)
The public authorities seek to maximize the per sector- expected flow of half ideas by
choosing the optimal scale for public laboratories:
max
zG
P (t)L¯G
zG
θG(zG − φ,NO, P (t)) = max
zG
µ
L¯G
zG
¶1−a
λ0
p
zG − φ. (49)
The solution for the public sector maximization problem (48) is:
z∗G = 2φ
1− a
1− 2a (50)
Q.E.D.
1.C - PROOF of Proposition 1. Letting m0Priv denote the equilibrium mass
of A0 sectors in the privatized - i.e. with patentable research tools - basic R&D economy,
m0PuIneﬀ, the equilibrium mass of A0 sectors in the ineﬃciently run public - i.e. with
unpatentable research tools - basic R&D economy, the following relationship holds in all
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comparisons we made:
L¯G = m0PrivnO2φ⇒ nO =
L¯G
m0Priv2φ
. (51)
In the steady state the innovation rate of the private basic R&D economy is:
InnovPriv = m0Priv
µ
L¯G
m0Priv2φ
¶1−a
λ0
p
φ = ma0Priv
µ
L¯G
2φ
¶1−a
λ0
p
φ. (52)
The innovation rate of the public ineﬃcient economy is:
InnovPuIneﬀ = m0PuIneﬀ
Ã
L¯G
2φ 1−a
1−2a
!1−a
2λ0
r
φ
1− 2a . (53)
By dividing eq. (52) by (53), and letting a→ 0, we get:
InnovPriv
InnovPuIneﬀ
→ (m0Priv)
a
m0PuIneﬀ
µ
1− a
1− 2a
¶1−a
(1− 2a)
1
2 →
a→0
1
m0PuEf
> 1. (54)
Q.E.D.
PROOF of Proposition 2. Consider the following ratio:
InnovPriv
InnovPuIneﬀ
=
(m0Priv)
a
m0PuIneﬀ
µ
1− a
1− 2a
¶1−a
(1− 2a)
1
2 (55)
Let us first note that
¡
1−a
1−2a
¢1−a
(1− 2a)
1
2 is a positive number lower than 1 for all
values of a between zero and 1/2. To see this, remind that
¡
1−a
1−2a
¢1−a
(1− 2a)
1
2 = 1 when
a = 0, and that it is positive when 0 < a < 1/2. Moreover, it is strictly decreasing
for 0 ≤ a < 1/2 which is seen in a simple way by derivating its natural logarithm with
respect to a, and getting:
ln
µ
1− 2a
1− a
¶
< 0.
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Let us now note that, from the properties of our model, the limit, as λ1 tends to
infinity, of the measure of A0 tends to 1 in both economies, because in the limit the
applied R&D instantaneously completes any new half-idea, immediately reflecting each
sector that enters A1 into A025. Therefore:
InnovPriv
InnovPuIneﬀ
→
λ1→∞
(1− a)1−a
(1− 2a)1−a−
1
2
< 1, 0 < a < 1/2. (56)
Q.E.D.
25Notice that in this case our model behaves as the standard quality ladder growth model - in which
A0 = [0, 1] - and no completing half-ideas are required.
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Figures to be inserted in the text: 
 
 
 
 FIGURE 2: COMPARISON OF THE INNOVATIVE PERFORMANCES, 
SIMULATION RESULTS.
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 FIGURE 3: U.S. PATENT RATIO OVER TIME 
  U.S., 1953-1982.
SOURCE: World Intellectual Property Organization and National Science Board (2006).
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FIGURE 4: ESTIMATION FOR THE APPLIED R&D PRODUCTIVITY
U.S., 1973 -1979.
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 FIGURE 5: ESTIMATION FOR THE BASIC R&D PRODUCTIVITY
U.S., 1973 -1979.
1.95795
1.59646
1.39286
1.01343
0.900
1.100
1.300
1.500
1.700
1.900
2.100
1973 1975 1977 1979
year
B
as
ic
 re
se
ar
ch
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
 
 
FIGURE 6: COMPARISON OF THE INNOVATIVE PERFORMANCES, 
SIMULATION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. DATA, 1973-1979.
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